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Abstract
Issues in the security of medical data present a greater challenge than in other data security environments. The
complexity of  the threats and ethics involved,  coupled with the poor management of  these threats makes the
protection of data in clinical practice problematic. This paper discusses the security threats to medical data in
terms of confidentiality, privacy, integrity, misuse and availability, and reviews the issue of responsibility with
reference  to  clinical  governance.  Finally,  the  paper  uncovers  some  of  the  underlying  reasons  for  the
underestimation of the threats to medical data by the medical profession.
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INTRODUCTION
“The healthcare industry has  historically  lagged  behind other  industries  in  its  understanding of  information
security issues and the funds expended for adequate information security programs. Information systems (IS)
audit and security professionals will have a greater challenge on their hands to help those organizations protect
the confidentiality,  integrity,  and availability  of  clinical,  financial  and human resource information.” (Jones,
1998).  The  advances  in  computer  and  communications  technology  have  increased  the  awareness  of  the
susceptibility  of  sensitive  patient  information  to  breaches  of  privacy  and  confidentiality  (AHA  Insurance
Resource, 1999). Also, navigating the various legislative changes in individual countries is proving difficult for
the physician responsible for protection of patient data (Gilkes, Casimiro, McEvoy, MacFarlane, & Kitchen,
2003). The use of legislation to protect the privacy and confidentiality of patient information promotes the notion
of accountability.  However,  it  has been suggested that  they should instead be promoting improved sharing,
management and communication of information (Meredith, 2005). Whilst the law is seen as a protective tool it
should also allow a more open approach to the use of information. Patient information is used for much more
than individual patient health status management; it  is used to inform future clinical practice; to plan health
services; and as a clinical research and evaluation base (Black, 1999). More importantly, to be able to inform
clinical practice and other research activities, patient information must be accurate and complete.
A review of the literature reveals that there are few publications on the adequate protection of medical data,
whilst there are numerous reviews on how confidentiality affects medical practice and how legislation should be
interpreted. Whilst most countries are still in the stages of discussing the importance of confidentiality, few have
answers as to how to approach it. This leaves the question as to why the security of medical data is poorly
performed. Perhaps, like other information dependent industries, “data security seems like a costly and boring
chore” ("Leaders: Hot data; Data protection," 2005). Alternatively, perhaps it is too hard an area to tackle, or that
the once protective culture of trust in handling medical information still holds strong. 
THREATS TO MEDICAL DATA
As in any field, security of medical data can be defined as affecting: 
• Confidentiality, accessible by authorised personnel only;
•Integrity, ensuring assets modified by authorised parties only (also includes accuracy); and
•Availability, ensuring accessibility by authorised users, when required. (Pfleeger, 1997)
These issues must be viewed from the physical, data related and management perspectives. The physical threats
may incur data loss however physical security concerns are widely discussed in texts on computer security and
related publications (Dennis, 2002; Pfleeger, 1997). The issues of physical security are the same as for any open
access environment. However, confidentiality and privacy are primary concerns for medical  data, as are the
integrity, misuse and availability of the information.
Confidentiality and Privacy
Firstly, it is important to understand the difference between confidentiality and privacy as the terms are often
used  synonymously,  although  incorrectly.  Confidentiality  can  be  defined  as  “entrusted  communication  of
information which is considered private and implies an ethical or legal principle” (Centre for Cancer Education,
1998a), whilst privacy is defined as “the state of being free from intrusion or disturbance in one's private life or
affairs” (Centre for Cancer Education, 1998b).  Broadly speaking, confidentiality in medicine refers to the non-
disclosure  of  personal  information without  consent,  whereas  privacy  is  associated with  identification  of  an
individual from data or information. “Maintaining patient confidentiality and obtaining the consent of patients to
share information about themselves are core principles of the medical profession” (Chester, 2003). This premise
is  being  threatened  as  the requirement  to  keep copious  notes,  in  order  to  meet  both  government  reporting
requirements and for potential information sharing, poses risks in patient information disclosure without consent.
In Australia, legislation has been inadequate in terms of protection of health information (Williams, 2005). This
is confirmed by the report  of  the  Australian Health  Information Council  where privacy legislation is  being
revisited and patient consent regarding shared information is being opened to public debate (ICTSC, 2004). An
added level of complexity exists in Australia where public and private health providers are working together in
the national health system. This creates confusion under which rules and regulations each provider is working
under. 
The discussion on confidentiality also includes the rights of patients and what they should be allowed to see. As
Meredith (2005) points out, there are questions over patient rights to view information that may be harmful to
them or received from third party health providers. This highlights yet more complexity on ownership of records,
the right to view and use information, and information sharing.  Given that in the UK a revised confidentiality
code of practice emphasises informing patients of the use of their data, and that most people seem uninterested in
the issue, perhaps the efforts put into confidentiality would be better put to ensuring patients are aware of their
rights about data (Adams, Budden, Hoare, & Sanderson, 2004). However, other studies report that whilst “data
protection and information sharing issues are poorly understood by doctors, but of vital importance to patients”
(Pati, 2004). 
To address some of the issues in privacy the  Australian Health Ministers’ National Health Privacy Working
Group is developing a National Health Privacy Code. Where sensitive personal information is recorded, “privacy
is a fundamental principle underpinning quality health care”, and the proposed code is designed to “safeguard the
health privacy and dignity of all individuals; achieve national consistency in health privacy protection - across
jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors; and take into account changes in the way personal health
information is handled as a result of technological change” (Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing,
2004). The technological changes leading to electronic communication and EMR have brought a fresh set of
challenges  in  maintaining privacy.  The benefits  of  increased  access  to  information for  the  patient  must  be
weighed against the increased privacy risks (ICTSC, 2004).
Public Health
Public health and epidemiological research are areas which may cross the boundaries of privacy although not
always  confidentiality.  “Public  health  is  the  arena  in  which  clinical  medicine,  epidemiology,  management,
politics, and the law all meet—or perhaps more accurately, collide.” (Lyons et al., 1999). Indeed, there have been
suggestions that public health will suffer from the increasing limitation of data protection legislation (Lawlor &
Stone, 2001). It becomes the traditional debate of the good of the patient versus the good of society. As Strobl,
Cave and Walley (2000) suggest significant amounts of research, both epidemiological and in health economics,
would not be possible if only completely de-identified data were used. The accuracy of this research depends on
linking of  data using codes,  although not  necessarily  identifying individuals.  Patient  consent is  usually  the
concern in matters of public health research. Arguably it is in all our interests to protect the general population
against infectious disease, however to do this, confidential data is needed for which it is not always possible to
obtain consent. Therefore, privacy may be maintained but the premise of confidentiality may be compromised as
data is passed on without consent (Turnberg, 2003). Clearly epidemiological health research has many issues that
need resolving in relation to the use of patient data and obtaining consent. Debate on confidentiality and the
wider public gains using individual patient data are yet to be well thought-out (Ward et al., 2004). 
Other issues: criminal or carelessness.
Although not such as obvious an issue is the maintenance of confidentiality and privacy when residual files has
been left on a hard disk, or deleted files are recovered.  Data recovery from hard disk crashes and corruption is
possible  using  data  recovery  services  or  home software  tools  (Steers,  2005).  The threat  therefore exists  of
careless disposal and recovery of files with criminal intent. There have been numerous occurrences of private and
confidential data being left on computer hard disks that have subsequently been on sold or reused, in which the
receiver has been able to reconstitute the residual data on the disk (Evers, 2005). Such data protection concerns
should not be overlooked in either the physical or ethical sense. 
Integrity and misuse
Integrity, loss and misuse of data are also key issues in the medical environment. The movement of data in a
paper based system has the potential for loss, particularly if there are multiple health care providers involved.
There are some provisions for protection of paper based records which disappear in the electronic environment.
The ability to lock information away one place and control individual access is more straightforward. Likewise,
the custodian of the paper based records has an acute understanding the confidential nature of those records,
whereas once the information is replicated and disseminated more widely the responsibility understanding can
become diluted. The Australian Health Information Council points out that the infrastructure and standards that
are used for paper-less transfers of data must ensure the integrity and modification process of that data (ICTSC,
2004). Authentication and non-repudiation are essential to these procedures. 
Misuse of health information will occur where there is perceived value of personal information to third parties.
There  are  numerous  examples  in  the  media  and  in  official  reports  recounting  incidents  where  personal
information has been misused. Information has been sold to pharmaceutical companies and genetic information
has been used for employment and insurance restrictions (Aiken, 1999; Commonwealth Department of Health
and Aged Care, 2000). Technology unfortunately does not have all the solutions to data misuse and loss. Health
providers have a significant number of data security related occurrences each year, some of this is attributed to
the lack of importance staff place on adhering to security policy and procedure (Carter, 2000). 
Another consideration to the integrity of data is the way in which new wireless technologies are used. With the
arrival  of  the  personal  digital  assistants  (PDA)  and  the  tablet  PC,  the  mobility  facilitated  by  wireless
communications has been vastly increased.  These devices have a specific set of security concerns attached to
both the device technology and their operation in medical practice (Rosenthal, 2004; Terado & Williams, 2005).
Although there is concern of interception during data transfer with such devices, there is  also a problem of
accuracy of  records  where  synchronisation with  a  central  database  is  concerned (Veltman,  2003;  Williams,
2005). The integrity and dependable nature of the data itself is important. It has been shown that the usefulness of
clinical  databases  is  often  described  in  terms of  its  comprehensiveness  of  the  data set  and the  information
accessibility (Gilkes et al., 2003). Ensuring that integrity and completeness occurs is a fundamental principle of
information management. 
Availability
Availability relates to both the access to data and access to the computing services. Some of the issues in this
area are standard physical security matters, whilst others relate to availability of infrastructure and timely access
to data.  For  instance,  access  to  patient  records  is  important  when  dealing  with  patients  out  of  the  normal
consultation or hospital environment. The use of mobile devices to provide access to patient records at the point
of clinical care is being trialled worldwide and is providing both access to medical records and clinical decision
support  (Bower,  2004;  Carroll,  Tarczy-Hornoch,  O'Reilly,  &  Christakas,  2004).  Availability  of  electronic
information,  in  particular  the  adoption  of  electronic  medical  records,  is  also  affected by standardisation  of
information. The Australian Health Information Council suggests that the representation of data is the key to
information sharing and includes standardisation in clinical terminologies,  decision support,  risk assessment,
clinical workflow, and communication methods (ICTSC, 2004). 
Even more fundamental to data availability are the security concerns of data protection in the form of backup and
protection against power surges. Whilst these are two important measures, they are also the most poorly met
requirements in security. “Today's healthcare delivery system involves a complex array of medical computerized
information databases and instrumentation. These microprocessor-based computers are extremely sensitive to
power anomalies such as brownouts, blackouts, spikes and line noises. While electrical companies make every
effort to maintain reliability, there is no guarantee of power quality and availability” (Appelt, 2005). 
CLINICAL GOVERNANCE: WHO TAKES RESPONSIBILTY?
When data  is  situated  in  one  place  and  is  effectively  under  the  auspices  of  a  discreet  medical  entity,  the
responsibility for the data lies with the management of the entity. This situation becomes more complicated as
patient information is transferred from one entity to another in electronic form. This raises questions such as
ownership of the data; responsibility for ensuring confidentiality; and responsibility for data integrity. These
issues become blurred and often too difficult to answer. For instance, when data is transferred from a pathology
laboratory to a general practice, who assumes responsibility to ensure the data remains intact and correct? The
answers may vary depending on what stage of the transfer the data is at risk. When creating and sending the data
is it clearly the responsibility of the pathology provider. When it is received by the practice it then becomes their
responsibility.  Whose  responsibility  is  it  when  it  is  in  transit?  In  assessment  of  risk  and  apportioning
responsibility inevitably discussion is in terms of legal ramifications. Moreover, perhaps a perception exists that
the problems will rarely occur and therefore are not considered important. This issue can only be reconciled
using risk assessment techniques.
The patient perspective must also be considered. In general, medical information is recorded by the practitioner
and normally patients do not decide which pieces of information are retained. Consideration is required when
sharing medical records both within a practice and in any proposed national electronic records scheme. If a
patient  chooses  not  to  have  some information shared, the  affect  on  their  subsequent  medical  care  must  be
considered. This has wider ramifications for population health and research where data is collected about the
health and disease status of sections of society (Carter, 2000). 
Finally, there is increasing pressure on health service providers to show best practice. This is both in terms of
outcomes for the patient and in terms of costs and contributions to medical research (Chester, 2003). As more
information is required to be given to the health governing bodies, the confidentiality of patient information is
again compromised. Medical data is needed for many purposed including medical research, disease registries,
medical education, public health monitoring, planning regional patient service, risk management and medical
complaint/misconduct investigation. Indeed the General Medical Council in the UK suggests that demonstrated
best practice and professional standards can be effective strategies against the lack of security in disseminating
patient information (Chester, 2003). 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
A lack of recognition of the issues involved in computerized databases and basic security measures indicates a
dangerous gap in the security of medical data. Despite the introduction of electronic medical records some 20
years ago (Bolton & Gay, 1995), medical practitioners and their professional associations are only now realising
the potential that technological connectedness brings. At the same time they are realising the problems linked to
the major deployment of such initiatives.  Many healthcare professionals are unclear about privacy and data
protection laws and what they mean in practice (Meredith, 2005).
Whilst data sharing is vulnerable to unauthorised access, reduced integrity and issues of confidentiality, many of
the issues arise from poor system configuration and inadvertent access activities. To compensate for lack of
information elsewhere the General Practice Computing Group have recently released a guideline for security in
general practice.  These guidelines include  responsibility for security issues; policies; access control; disaster
planning; backup; internet controls; and secure communications (Schattner, 2005). Even when ‘basic’ security
measures are in place a new breed of risks is on the horizon with the advent of national electronic patient records.
In the mean time, good protection, monitoring and auditing should be in place. Gilkes et al (2003, p.427) suggest
that  data protection is  “the balance between facilitating important research and audit, and protecting patient
confidentiality”.  There is  clearly a need to address elementary security concerns such as access control and
auditing, however this should be addressed at the developmental software and database planning stage rather than
at implementation. The evolving way in which we use electronic health information needs to be reflected in the
production of clinical IT systems. 
The Australian Health Online Committee (Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, 2004) research
concluded that the obstructions to information sharing were overestimated, particularly when compared to the
potential  benefits  that  sharing  can  bring.  Despite  this  realising  the  potential  for  sharing  is  by  no  means
uncomplicated. This discourse highlights the critical issues pertaining to security in clinical practice, particularly
relating to confidentiality and privacy. The underestimation of the potential for damage to both records and
reputation by the medical profession has occurred from lack of understanding and from the conservative, trustful
culture of the profession. Unfortunately these threats must be taken serious if patient information is not be put at
risk as we move forward in the technological revolution.
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